Norwalk v. Doutel - Motion to Vacate (05/23/2011)


On May 23 2011, Attorney Baird filed for a motion to vacate the order Judge Bruce Hudock had placed against Mr. Doutel on May 20 2011 ordering him to not possess any firearms or reapplying for his state permit to carry pistols revolvers.

Attorney Baird argues that even if Mr. Doutel is convicted of Threatening in the Second Degree [CGS 53a-62], that he will not be disqualified by statute [CGS 29-28c] to possess a permit to carry a pistol or revolver. It is also argued that there is no provision in the state statutes pertaining to an order of protection (CGS 46b-38c(e), CGS 54-1k, 54-82k and 53a-223).

Since the charge does not disqualify Mr. Doutel and a protective order is not permitted under the circumstances, there is no justification for his firearms to be under seizure and there is no reason Mr. Doutel could not possess a state permit to carry pistols and revolvers.

Attorney Baird argues that the evidence is insufficient to proceed to trial. The argument is that the only real evidence that has been submitted for the case is the voicemail Mr. Doutel left on Dr. Staw's phone system which is not threatening and reveal no implication of any use of a firearm. Even with the assertions made in the police reports (which are demonstrably false), the prosecution does not have a case for Threatening in the Second Degree (53a-62).

Attorney Baird then argues that the entire premise of the case seeks to violate Mr. Doutel's first and second amendment rights.

The voicemail referenced makes no threat, nor does it mention firearms or the use of firearms in any way. Charging Mr. Doutel with Threatening in the Second Degree based on his non-threatening choice of words is a violation of his first amendment right to express dissatisfaction with his doctor.

Attorney Baird argues that Mr. Doutel's second amendment rights come into play because the police clearly allege that Mr. Doutel's exercise of his second amendment rights have been used as justification to curtail his first amendment rights. The exercise of neither right can be taken to constitute a crime, and the combination of the two does nothing further.

Attorney Baird proceeds to argue that the arrest lacked the basic burden of probable cause since Mr. Doutel never made any kind of verbal threat. Instead, the injustices Mr. Doutel has been burdened with are based on the court and the state's insitence to promote their prejudice against Mr. Doutel and his rights.

The email exchange between Attorney Baird and Sgt Weisgerber of the Norwalk Police department is both attached to this motion and mentioned in the motion. The email exchange shows Attorney Baird applying for a new state pistol permit with the Norwalk Police department and being denied of such, not based on the law, but rather based on Sgt Weisgerber's prejudices (or possibly the prejudices of a higher rank). Sgt Weigerber could not articulate an argument based on the Connecticut General Statutes, so instead he turneed

The argument is made that if the police had possess probable cause that Mr. Doutel was a risk to himself or others, that they would have applied for a warrant (CGS 29-38c) to seize the firearms in his possesion. The Norwalk Police department did not do this, likely because they did not possess the probable cause for this kind of warrant. This kind of seizrue would have entitled Mr. Doutel to a hearing within 14 days like any reasonable interpretation of due process would have allowed for.

Attorney Baird concludes that Mr. Doutel is entitled to an evidentiary hearing within 14 days due to the Norwalk Police Department, the State and the Court bypassing all statutory procedure and due process to legitimize their own prejudices.