Norwalk v. Doutel - Status Update #2 (07/05/2011)

Court opens in front of Judge Maureen Dennis with a surprise filing by State's Attorney Lockshier to substitute the charge of Threatening in the Second Degree (CGS) to Harrassment in the Second Degree (CGS). This substitution also includes an order of protection against Mr. Doutel. This order of protection is the obvious reason for the substitution of a lesser charge since State's Attorney Lockshier is determined to keep Mr. Doutel from recovering his property from the Norwalk Police Department. The State's Attorney Lockshier knows that Attorney Baird will likely get the court order for conditions of release that restrict Mr. Doutel from possessing firearms struck down during this hearing.

The order of protection is a part of the Harrassment in the Second Degree statute, but it makes the case against Mr. Doutel even more peculiar.

Sec. 53a-183. Harassment in the second degree:
Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when: (1) By telephone, he addresses another in or uses indecent or obscene language; or (2) with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he communicates with a person by telegraph or mail, by electronically transmitting a facsimile through connection with a telephone network, by computer network, as defined in section 53a-250, or by any other form of written communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; or (3) with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm.

(b) For purposes of this section such offense may be deemed to have been committed either at the place where the telephone call was made, or at the place where it was received.

(c) The court may order any person convicted under this section to be examined by one or more psychiatrists.

(d) Harassment in the second degree is a class C misdemeanor.

The particulary strange part about this move (if we were to assume good intent from State's Attorney Lockshier) is that this change of charge and the protective order come 5 months after the incident and it comes without any accusation of contact between Mr. Doutel and anyone in Dr. Staw's office. There is no logical reason for the sudden concern for the safety of the complaintants with regards to Mr. Doutel possessing firearms outside of the prosecutor's own prejudice against Mr. Doutel and Mr. Doutel's rights. The prosecutor did not get her way by getting Mr. Doutel to accept Accelerated Rehab.

Attorney Baird articulates this point:
And in our opinion, the only reason the state is doing this is to avoid the full evidentiary hearing that Judge Hudock said that Mr. Doutel was entitled to upon that temporary order that he not possess firearms and now they're seeking an order of protection where there's been no indication that since this happened, my client had had any contact with this doctor.

And for the state to ask at this time for a protective order is clearly retaliatory for Mr. Doutel exercising his right to request a hearing on Judge Hudock's previous motion, previous order that he not possess firearms

This is a stale request for a protective order.

It's an issue of Mr. Doutel did not take AR.

When asked by the judge, State's Attorney Lockshier confirms that this protective order is for Sandy Staw, wife of Dr. Shaw.

State's Attorney Lockshier responds to Attorney Baird's request to the judge that the defendant be given access to the voicemail recording by confirming that the prosecution is not in possession of the recording, the Norwalk Police Department is.

The Judge Dennis concludes the status hearing by reinforcing the fact that the protective order is in place, no matter what happens with or to the temporary order on the conditions of release ordered by Judge Hudock. This is obviously State's Attorney Lockshier's plan all along, as there is no logical reasoning present for whay the protective order is suddenly so important.