Court opens in front of Judge Maureen Dennis with a surprise filing by State's Attorney
Lockshier to substitute the charge of Threatening in the Second Degree (CGS) to
Harrassment in the Second Degree (CGS). This substitution also includes an order
of protection against Mr. Doutel. This order of protection is the obvious reason
for the substitution of a lesser charge since State's Attorney Lockshier is determined
to keep Mr. Doutel from recovering his property from the Norwalk Police Department.
The State's Attorney Lockshier knows that Attorney Baird will likely get the court
order for conditions of release that restrict Mr. Doutel from possessing firearms
struck down during this hearing.
The order of protection is a part of the Harrassment in the Second Degree statute,
but it makes the case against Mr. Doutel even more peculiar.
Harassment in the second degree:
Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when:
(1) By telephone, he addresses another in or uses indecent or obscene language;
or (2) with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he communicates with
a person by telegraph or mail, by electronically transmitting a facsimile through
connection with a telephone network, by computer network, as defined in section
53a-250, or by any other form of written communication, in a manner likely to cause
annoyance or alarm; or (3) with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person,
he makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, in a manner likely
to cause annoyance or alarm.
(b) For purposes of this section such offense may be deemed to have been committed
either at the place where the telephone call was made, or at the place where it
(c) The court may order any person convicted under this section to be examined by
one or more psychiatrists.
(d) Harassment in the second degree is a class C misdemeanor.
The particulary strange part about this move (if we were to assume good intent from
State's Attorney Lockshier) is that this change of charge and the protective order
come 5 months after the incident and it comes without any accusation of contact
between Mr. Doutel and anyone in Dr. Staw's office. There is no logical reason for
the sudden concern for the safety of the complaintants with regards to Mr. Doutel
possessing firearms outside of the prosecutor's own prejudice against Mr. Doutel
and Mr. Doutel's rights. The prosecutor did not get her way by getting Mr. Doutel
to accept Accelerated Rehab.
Attorney Baird articulates this point:
And in our opinion, the only reason the state is doing this is to avoid the full
evidentiary hearing that Judge Hudock said that Mr. Doutel was entitled to upon
that temporary order that he not possess firearms and now they're seeking an order
of protection where there's been no indication that since this happened, my client
had had any contact with this doctor.
And for the state to ask at this time for a protective order is clearly retaliatory
for Mr. Doutel exercising his right to request a hearing on Judge Hudock's previous
motion, previous order that he not possess firearms
This is a stale request for a protective order.
It's an issue of Mr. Doutel did not take AR.
When asked by the judge, State's Attorney Lockshier confirms that this protective
order is for Sandy Staw, wife of Dr. Shaw.
State's Attorney Lockshier responds to Attorney Baird's request to the judge that
the defendant be given access to the voicemail recording by confirming that the
prosecution is not in possession of the recording, the Norwalk Police Department
The Judge Dennis concludes the status hearing by reinforcing the fact that the protective
order is in place, no matter what happens with or to the temporary order on the
conditions of release ordered by Judge Hudock. This is obviously State's Attorney
Lockshier's plan all along, as there is no logical reasoning present for whay the
protective order is suddenly so important.